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ABSTRACT∗∗: Numerous renegotiations have plagued Latin
American infrastructure concession contracts in the 1990s, to the
point that private sector involvement is being questioned in some
countries. This issue has been analyzed in a series of papers by
Guasch et al. (2003, 2006a, 2006b). After putting these contribu-
tions in the context of the theoretical and empirical literature on
contract renegotiation, this note surveys the existing evidence on
the determinants of these renegotiations and discusses the main
policy implications regarding the necessity of efficient regulatory
institutions and the adequate type of price regulation.
1. Introduction
This paper reviews and discusses the empirical evidence and the
policy implications from a set of papers analyzing the determinants of
infrastructure concession contracts across Latin America in the 1990s.
The insights from these studies are interesting for two main reasons.
First, despite the fact that the theoretical contracting literature
has long been dealing with potential and actual renegotiations,
to our knowledge no previous empirical studies had analyzed the
determinants of renegotiations in a systematic way, incorporating
variables that capture both contract clauses along several dimensions
and characteristics of the economic and institutional environment.
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Second, the recurrent conflicts that plague the operation of
concessions in Latin America have major welfare consequences for
the population there, so their understanding and the consequent
definition of better mechanisms to enable private participation in
infrastructure constitute a vital public policy objective.
The objective of the paper is therefore twofold. First, it puts the
empirical evidence in the context of the existing literature, and second
it presents the specific empirical results and discusses how they
inform the practical policy debate on the issue of private investment
in infrastructure. To this end, it is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we briefly discuss how the issue of renegotiation has been addressed
in the theoretical and empirical contracting literature and present
the approach developed by Guasch et al. (2003, 2006a). In Section 3,
we detail the Latin American experience with concessions and discuss
how the issue of contract renegotiation has affected the process.
Subsequently, we summarize in Section 4 the main results concerning
the determinants of these renegotiations from the two papers
mentioned above. Finally, we discuss in Section 5 the main policy
consequences regarding regulatory agencies and the type of price
regulation and conclude.
2. Renegotiation: theory and empirics
While the regulation literature1 has in general considered
complete contracting frameworks, in which contracts are perfectly en-
forced thanks to the good quality of supporting institutions (judiciary,
regulatory agencies) that have been set up in the past, there is a
growing recognition that imperfect enforcement and renegotiation are
major issues in most developing countries.2
It is well known from the contracting literature that with
complete contracts, even when the principal cannot commit not to
renegotiate ex post, there might be inefficiencies linked to the ratchet
effect but no actual renegotiation occurs along the equilibrium path
(Dewatripont, 1986, Laffont and Tirole, 1990). Any inefficiencies are
anticipated in the initial contract that becomes renegotiation-proof.
Renegotiation occurs only if the initial contract is plagued by
some type of incompleteness.3 In this context, the design of models
1 See Laffont and Tirole (1993).
2 World Bank (2001).
3 See Tirole (1999) and the references herein.
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suited to the analysis of different issues becomes a practical exercise
in identifying the reasons behind the observed incompleteness in each
specific context and making the correct assumptions (Laffont, 2005).
In the case of renegotiation of infrastructure contracts, following a
methodology first introduced by Laffont (2003), Guasch et al. (2003)
propose a model in which the incompleteness of contracts is linked
to some imperfection of the judicial system and other institutions
in charge of enforcing contracts with outside investors, and the
government is able to invest in a costly enforcement technology, in
the spirit of the law enforcement approach of the Chicago school.4
The basic model is an ex ante regulatory contract between
the government and a firm, under asymmetric information on the
firm’s cost, which the firm accepts or not before discovering its type.
Therefore, because the participation constraint is only satisfied in
expectation at the signing of the deal, ex post a high-cost firm is left
with a negative utility (see Laffont and Martimort, 2002, chapter 2)
and would like to renegotiate the contract. The government can
then invest in a costly mechanism that ensures the enforcement
of the contract with some probability, depending on the level of
expenses incurred. The model is then enriched to include a number of
characteristics of concession contracts, as well as the regulatory envi-
ronment, exogenous economic shocks and the quality of institutions.
The probability of renegotiation is then given by an expression
of the type:
Pr(renegotiation) = (1 −  − ε)(1 − (x)),
where  is the ex ante probability that the firm is of the high-cost
type, ε is a shortcut to model an exogenous shock on demand or on
the firms’ costs (through a devaluation or some similar macroeconomic
shock), and (x) is the probability that the contract is enforced, given
government’s expenses x.
As is clear from the above discussion, this model describes
renegotiations at the initiative of the firms. Guasch et al. (2006a)
develop this framework to account for government-led renegotiations.
The model is extended to several periods. At the beginning of each of
them, elections take place and the incumbent government is replaced
with some exogenous probability.5 While the government that signed
4 See for example Becker (1968), Becker and Stigler (1974). Guasch
et al. (2006b) present several extensions of this model.
5 See Besley and Coate (2003) for a discussion of the fact that
regulatory issues are not pivotal in shaping the outcome of general elections.
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the concession contract in the first place is unable to renegotiate, a
new government can generate some renegotiation in two ways. First
of all, it may offer the firm a new contract, with the previous outcome
representing the status quo utility level of the firm. This captures
the possibility of Pareto improving deals to account for changes in
the environment or in agents’ preferences. Second, there is a small
probability that this new government reneges on the initial contract
and expropriates the firm. This is akin to a country risk parameter,
known in expectation by the firm when signing the contract.
Guasch et al. (2006) show that the model then generates
predictions for the probability of renegotiations that are in line
with those related to firm-led renegotiations, except for the variables
entering the status quo of the parties (investment requirements,
existence of private financing, corruption), which are expected to have
reversed effects on the probability of firm-led versus government-led
renegotiations.
Finally, note that to our knowledge Guasch et al. (2003, 2006)
are the first papers to develop a systematic empirical analysis of
the determinants of renegotiations. While some existing contributions
have looked at the effect of the potential cost of ex post renegotiations
on the form of contracts among others,6 none provides for detailed
predictions on how specific aspects of the contracts and features of
the economic and institutional environment affect the probability of
renegotiation. In what follows, we present the results from these two
studies.
3. Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America
In the last decades, Latin America has been at the forefront
of the movement to attract private participation in infrastructure
(see Harris, 2003). Until the end of the 1990s, private investors have
committed important amounts to key projects throughout the region,
in the four main sectors of telecommunications, energy, transport and
water. In the latter two sectors, and to a lesser extent in electricity,
private involvement mostly took the form of concessions. Overall,
between 1990 and 2000, 89 per cent of water projects, 98 per cent of
transport projects and 54 per cent of energy projects were adjudicated
using the concession model (Guasch, 2004).
6 See Crocker and Reynolds (1993) and Bajari et al. (2003) inter alia.
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A concession contract grants a private firm or consortium the
right to operate a given infrastructure in exchange for the revenues
generated by users’ payments. It is typically granted for a limited
period of time (in general between 15 and 30 years), after which the
underlying assets are devolved to the state. This scheme has often
been used to circumvent the political problems and sometimes the
legal or constitutional impediments linked to the transfers of assets
to private, sometimes foreign operators that take place in outright
privatizations.
However, several problems have plagued the concession model.
First of all, despite its growing involvement, private capital never fully
compensated the parallel reduction in public investment that took
place since the end of the 1980s (Caldero´n and Serve´n, 2004). This
failure to attract sufficient capital to bridge what many observers see
as a growing infrastructure gap has been accompanied by a strong
surge in dissatisfaction in Latin American public opinion. According
to Latinobarometro, an opinion survey realized every year in
18 countries of the region, as of 2003, 67 per cent of the respondents
disagree to some extent that privatizations were beneficial for their
country. In no country is this negative perception lower than 50 per
cent (the minimum is 53 per cent in Honduras), and it is above
80 per cent in Argentina and Panama.
Although a number of explanations have been put forward to
explain such a public distrust, one major reason seems to be the
perception that the process fostered corrupt deals at the expense
of customers, in particular through numerous renegotiations of the
initial contracts (Martimort and Straub, 2006).
As a matter of fact, considering an exhaustive data set of more
than 1,000 concessions in Latin America and the Caribbean during
the period 1985–2000, it appears that, excluding telecommunications
where most projects were real privatizations with transfer of assets,
41 per cent of the total projects in the three remaining sectors were
renegotiated at some point. In water and transport, renegotiations
have affected 74 per cent and 55 per cent of the projects respectively,
and have occurred 1.6 years and 3.1 years on average after the award,
despite most of these contracts having been signed for 15 years or
more (Guasch, 2004).
Moreover, renegotiations have an important negative impact
on users. The costs include service disruption, non-compliance with
expansion targets and excessive prices due to cost pass-through
charged to customers, among others. In Mexico, the concession toll
C© 2006 The Authors
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road program started at the beginning of the 1990s was finally
bailed out by the government in 1997 at a cost of approximately
1 to 1.7 per cent of GDP. Similar costs are to be expected in
Argentina, where the whole set of concessions is in disarray and a
difficult renegotiation process is ongoing since the 2001 crisis, or in
Bolivia where major water concessions were recently cancelled by the
government following popular protest (Guasch et al. 2006a).
The broader picture shows that renegotiations may be of two
types. First of all, there are renegotiations initiated by operators
(Guasch et al. 2003). These might be shock related, when a
devaluation or a recession make the operation of a given concession
unsustainable. In a region that has proved very volatile over the last
20 years, this is a major concern for policy makers. They might also
be opportunistic, when a firm uses its bargaining power in bilateral
negotiation with the government or the regulatory agency to strike a
better deal than the initially agreed one. This affects one of the central
benefits of the concession model, namely the competitive pressure
introduced by the ex ante auction procedure. To the extent that
firms are aware of the potential gains due to their bargaining power
in a subsequent bilateral negotiation with sometimes inexperienced
government officials, they may be tempted to strategically undercut
rivals at the bidding stage.
Second, renegotiations are sometimes initiated by governments
(Guasch et al. 2005). Again, this may reflect simple changes of
priorities, or unforeseen evolutions of the economic environment,
and be of a Pareto improving nature. However, most government-led
renegotiations happen to be opportunistic, with politicians during or
after an election campaign reneging on previous contracts to please
their constituencies.
The outcome of these renegotiations depends on who initiated
them. Most of the time, they lead to delays or reduction in in-
vestments, tariff increases or increases in the number of cost pass-
through, and other adjustments favorable to the firms. In a subset,
however, changes appear to be unfavorable to operators, reflecting a
number of government initiated renegotiations mentioned above.
4. Data and empirical results
The empirical analysis presented in Guasch et al. (2003,
2006a) is based on a unique data set including information about
infrastructure contracts in Latin America between 1985 and 2000
C© 2006 The Authors
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(see Guasch, 2004, for a complete description of the database). The
analysis focuses on contracts in the water and transport sector,
because these are the sectors in which real concessions have been
granted, as opposed to outright privatizations. As a results, the
sample is an unbalanced panel comprising 307 projects in five
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico), across
12 years, for a total of 1287 observations.
For each contract, the data includes information on the general
characteristics of the projects (sector, year of award, duration), on
the award process, the investment and financing conditions, the
institutional and regulatory context and the type of price regulation
in place (price cap versus rate of return), and other contract clauses
(arbitration, income guarantees, take-over clauses, etc.). These are
completed by macroeconomic data (growth rate, exchange rate evo-
lution), dummies for national and local elections and a full set of
institutional indicators (corruption, quality of the bureaucracy, rule
of law).
The initial estimations are based on a random effect probit,
which is a linearized version of the equations giving the probabilities
of firm-led and government-led renegotiations respectively. Moreover,
the papers address the key issue of contract clauses endogeneity.
The fundamental problem is that all the clauses that are the result
of a negotiation process between the parties willing to enter in a
contractual agreement are subject to a self-selection problem, because
the parties select them according to their sometimes unobservable
characteristics or those of the projects. Standard examples include
the fact that putting a minimum income guarantee clause has been
widely used by governments to attract private operators to risky
concessions (for example in the transport sector). Similarly, more
efficient operators are more likely to push for a price cap type of
regulation, under which they are residual claimants for their cost
savings; the financing structure is also likely to be influenced by the
nature of the project and the identity of the potential contractors.
The objective is to eliminate this ex ante self-selection effect, in
order to isolate the true incentive dimension of each specific aspect
of the contracts. This is done by testing for endogeneity using the
Rivers-Vuong test (1988) and then using a two-stage IV procedure
advocated by Angrist (1991).7
7 See Guasch et al. (2006a) for a detailed discussion of the econometric
issues involved, in particular the definition of adequate instrumental
variables.
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Table 1 – Significant determinants of renegotiations
Government-led renegotiation Firm-led renegotiation
Existence of a regulator Negative Negative
Price cap regulation Positive Positive
Duration Positive Positive
Investment requirements Positive Negative
Exclusive private financing Negative Positive
Quality of bureaucracy Negative Negative
Corruption Positive Negative
Election (lagged) Positive Positive
Growth (lagged) Negative Negative
Minimum income gaurantee Positive Positive
Source: Guasch et al. (2006a)
Table 1 summarizes the main results from the two papers. It
shows the variables that have been found to have a significant impact
on the probability of renegotiation, and highlights the fact that the
reversed signs predicted by the theoretical analysis were confirmed
empirically.
The expected reversed signs hold true for the investment
requirement and the private financing variable. Note also that mini-
mum income guarantee is consistently positive, which confirms that
this clause has a strongly adverse incentive property. Indeed, there is
ample evidence linking it to moral hazard problem and cost overrun
at the level of concessionaires, and to mounting fiscal problems for
governments, as for example in Colombia, where the fiscal cost of
these guarantees to date is around US$100 million (INCO 2004, Engel
et al. 2003).
5. Price regulation and the regulatory environment
To conclude, we want to discuss in some more details the main
policy implications of the results above, namely the importance of
having a regulator in place at the time the contract is enacted and
the adverse effect of price cap regulation. Simulations for specific
contracts in the sample, performed in Guasch et al. (2003) indicate
that the presence of a regulator might have reduced the probability
of renegotiation from 29.7 to 5.3 per cent for a rail concession in
Argentina, and from 9.9 to 0.3 per cent for the Buenos Aires water
concession for example. Similarly, a shift from price cap to rate of
return regulation would have reduced the respective probabilities
of renegotiation for these two concessions to 13.8 per cent and
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3.3 per cent respectively. These two aspects therefore signal areas
in which policy interventions are likely to have direct and significant
effect on the incidence of renegotiations.
On the first aspect, there is growing evidence to support the
fact that experienced regulators make a significant difference to
avoid failures during the early life of concession projects. Not only
do regulators allow for better quality contracts from the start, but
it appears that they are the more effective in weak governance
environments and constitute a barrier against opportunistic behavior
by governments (Guasch et al. 2006a). Our firm-level results are in
line with other cross-country studies that emphasize the importance
of experienced and independent regulators in the telecommunication
and electricity sectors (Wallsten 2001, Cubbin and Stern 2005).
To further illustrate the magnitude of the effects, Figure 1
shows the evolution of the hazard rate for an average duration of
the contracts (in years) in the case of government-led renegotiations,
splitting the sample into the cases that had a regulator in place when
signing the contract and those that didn’t.8
As for price regulation, in the last two decades, price cap
regulation, which was initially introduced by Professor Littlechild in
the UK, has been implemented all around the world. In our data set,
above 70 per cent of the concessions are regulated by price caps.
It was already well known that this regulatory scheme raises
several practical concerns, among which the impact on quality, the
choice of the technological adjustment term and the treatment of new
services.9 Moreover, we know that price cap regulation implies a risk
transfer from consumers to the firm. Such an increase in risk is bound
to be reflected in an increase of the cost of capital. As a matter of
fact, Alexander and Irwin (1996) show that price cap regulated firms
have systematically higher s than firms subject to rate of return
regulation, and therefore face higher interest rates.
Such an increase in the cost of capital has several implications.
First, it may reduce the private sector’s willingness to invest and
induce an adverse selection effect, with government privatizing the
‘crown jewels’ and being forced to deal with less attractive projects
without being able to use cross-subsidies anymore. Second, it implies
8 The following graphs are based on estimations from a competing risk
duration model.
9 See for example, Green and Rodriguez-Pardina (1996), Laffont and
Tirole (1999) and Noll (2000).
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Figure 1 – Hazard rate (Govt-led re neg) by existence of regulator at
signing of contract
that efficiency gains, assumed to be the major benefit of price cap
regulation, are at least partially lost to the concomitant rise in
costs.
But as Guasch et al. (2003, 2006a) show, the main consequence
is the increased probability of renegotiation. Figure 2 shows the
evolution of the hazard rate in the case of firm-led renegotiations,
splitting the sample into price cap versus rate of return projects.
Given the level of incidence (one half to three quarter of the
projects) and the costs discussed in the introduction, this is clearly
a major concern for regulators. On top of the reputation loss that
may affect the contractual parties, the increased risk of renegotiation
generates losses for consumers through higher prices, lower invest-
ments and net transfers to the firm at the award of the contracts,
eventually financed through taxes. For example, in the Buenos Aires
water concession, each point increase in the cost of capital translated
in a 3.5 per cent increase in tariffs (Guasch and Spiller, 1999).
The crucial point seems to be the interaction between the
price cap and the cost of capital, in situations characterized by
inexperienced institutions, with weak capability to resist outside
pressures. In a majority of cases, regulated firms appropriate the
gains made in favorable conjuncture (or these are partly captured by
government through taxes), but they renegotiate in case of difficulties,
effectively transferring losses to consumers.
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Figure 2 – Hazard rate (firm-led re neg) by type of regulation
One of the solutions considered to solve this problem is to
substitute pure price caps by hybrid schemes (see Estache et al.
2003, for a more detailed discussion). Such schemes would make more
intensive use of pass-through clauses linked to specific costs and
would be especially useful in very volatile environments and when
governance is weak. In effect, by reducing the exposure of firms to
unexpected supply shocks, it may significantly decrease the number of
cases in which calls for renegotiations become inevitable, substituting
them with an endogenous adjustment mechanism.
6. Conclusion
This paper has briefly summarized the evidence on concession
contracts renegotiations. After putting the analysis in the context of
the literature on contract renegotiation, it has discussed the main
policy implications in terms of regulation of private infrastructure op-
erators. Given the potentially large welfare consequences of conflicts
between these and local governments, it appears crucial to develop
a better understanding, through further empirical analysis, of the
specific mechanisms, both at the regulatory and contractual levels,
that would enable successful private participation in infrastructure.
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Rene´gociation des concessions d’infrastructure:
un aperc¸u ge´ne´ral
Dans les anne´es 90, les contrats de concessions d’infrastructure en
Ame´rique Latine ont e´te´ sujets a` de nombreuses rene´gociations, au
point que la participation du secteur prive´ est remise en question dans
certains pays. Cette question a e´te´ analyse´e dans une se´rie d’articles par
Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2003, 2006a, 2006b). Apre`s avoir situe´
ces contributions dans le contexte ge´ne´ral de la litte´rature the´orique et
empirique sur la rene´gociation des contrats, cette note re´sume les con-
clusions sur les causes de ces rene´gociations et discute les principales
implications pratiques de politique e´conomique, en particulier celles
ayant trait a` la ne´cessite´ d’institutions de re´glementation efficaces et
a` la re´glementation des prix.
Neuverhandlung von Infrastrukturkonzessionen:
ein U¨berblick
Lateinamerika wurde in den 1990er Jahren von zahlreichen Neu-
verhandlungen von Infrastruktur-Konzessionsvertra¨gen geplagt – bis
zu dem Punkt, dass die Beteiligung des privaten Sektors in einigen
La¨ndern in Frage gestellt wurde. Diese Thematik ist in einer Reihe
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von Aufsa¨tzen von Guasch, Laffont und Straub (2003, 2006a, 2006b)
analysiert worden. Nachdem diese Beitra¨ge in den Kontext der theo-
retischen und empirischen Literatur u¨ber Vertragsneuverhandlungen
gestellt wurden, wird im vorliegenden Artikel ein U¨berblick u¨ber die
vorhandenen Nachweise von Determinanten dieser Neuverhandlungen
gegeben, und es werden die wichtigsten Policy-Implikationen bezu¨glich
der Notwendigkeit effizienter regulatorischer Institutionen und der
ada¨quaten Art der Preisregulierung diskutiert.
Renegociacio´n de las concesiones de infraestructuras: una
visio´n general
En los an˜os 90, los contratos de concesiones de infraestructuras en
Ame´rica Latina han estado sujetos a numerosas renegociaciones, hasta
el punto de que la participacio´n del sector privado se ha puesto en
cuestio´n en algunos paı´ses. Este tema ha sido analizado en una serie de
artı´culos por Guasch, Laffont y Straub (2003, 2006a, 2006b). Despue´s
de situar estas contribuciones en el contexto general de la literatura
teo´rica y empı´rica sobre la renegociacio´n de contratos, la presente nota
resume las conclusiones sobre las causas de estas renegociaciones y
discute las principales implicaciones pra´cticas de polı´tica econo´mica,
en particular aquellas que tratan sobre la necesidad de instituciones
de reglamentacio´n eficaces y sobre la reglamentacio´n de los precios.
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